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CLAIRE A. HILL*
Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies
After Enron?
I. INTRODUCTION
ENRON WAS RATED INVESTMENT GRADE BY Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch
until four days before it declared bankruptcy'-scarcely a ringing endorsement of
the agencies' acumen.' And even before Enron (a term I will generally use in this
essay to include the other contemporaneous scandals of the time), the rating agen-
cies had come in for significant criticism.' Some commentators had long described
their ratings as worthless;4 others, only slightly more charitably, characterized the
agencies as offering a work-product that was 'good enough for government work'
but scarcely cutting edge.5 Yet many investors are now saying that in buying mort-
gage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations comprised in part of
those securities, and in appraising the quality of swap providers and insurers, they
relied on the rating agencies.' How can this reliance be reconciled with what pre-
ceded it?
This essay is part of a larger project on why subprime investors didn't demand a
(much larger) lemons premium.' In this essay, I argue that an adaptive trait-
incorporating new data that potentially conflicts with one's pre-existing worldview
Professor of Law, Director of the Institute for Law & Rationality, and 2008-2009 Vance K. Opperman
Research Scholar, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Eugene Borgida, Mauricio Delgado, Owen
Jones, Larry Isaacson, Art Markman, Paul Lawrence Rubin, Bobbie Spellman, and Kathleen Vohs for very
useful comments.
1. STAFF TO THE S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON:
THE SEC & PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 73, 115 (Comm. Print 2002), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/
100702watchdogsreport.pdf.
2. 1 will use the term "rating agencies" to refer to the most prominent such agencies, Moody's, Standard
and Poor's, and Fitch.
3. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel & Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit
Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 654-64 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Siskel & Ebert].
4. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 66 (Richard M. Levitch et al., eds., 2002) [hereinafter Partnoy, Paradox of Credit
Ratings].
5. For a general discussion on views of the capabilities of rating agencies, see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the
Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004) [hereinafter Hill, Rating Agencies].
6. See, e.g., Making Sense of the Madness, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 2008, at 66, 66-73.
7. See Claire A. Hill, Why Didn't Subprime Investors Demand A (Much Larger) Lemons Premium? (work-
ing paper on file with author); see also Claire A. Hill, Who Are the Villains in the Subprime Crisis and Why It
Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. LAW J. (forthcoming 2009).
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so as to preserve as much of that worldview as possible-proved to be maladaptive
in this circumstance.
It is not viable to thoroughly revisit one's pre-existing worldview at every possi-
ble disconfirmation-doing so would be paralyzing. Indeed, it is also a reasonable
and probably necessary prior belief that one's pre-existing worldview is sound, and
based on sufficient evidence. Again, the contrary is virtually unimaginable. The
result is that if possible, we interpret new data in a manner consistent with our pre-
existing worldview' We can do so in a variety of ways. One way, the one I will
discuss here, is to conclude that the worldview was too simple-it set forth a gen-
eral rule which we came to understand has exceptions (or more or likelier excep-
tions than we had believed). Or, there may be some broader revision, in which we
rearticulate the prior belief in a way that accommodates the evidence.
How did this phenomenon work when the rating agencies failed so miserably
with Enron? A simplified version of the story is as follows. Before Enron, the pre-
existing worldview among many market participants was that rating agencies were,
if not comprised of rocket scientists, sound enough.9 There was considerable evi-
dence for this view. While it was challenged by Enron, Enron could be accounted
for as the product of massive fraud, concealed by complexity."0 Indeed, Enron was
notoriously complex-some of its executives were among the most sophisticated of
the 'rocket scientists,' developing transaction structures dazzling in their intricacy."
But complexity was not sufficient, it was thought, to totally stymie the rating agen-
cies; after all, rating agencies had been successfully rating complex mortgage-
backed (and other asset-backed) securities for many years at that point. 2 It was
therefore plausible to believe that for the rating agencies to get it significantly
wrong, both massive fraud and complexity were necessary and that neither was
8. For a general discussion of how people react to and accommodate disconfirming evidence, see RICH-
ARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES & SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 167-92
(1980); see also Pam Belluck, Yes, Looks Do Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, available at http:/J
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/fashion/26looks.html. "When people don't fit our preconceived notions, we
tend to ignore the contradictions, until they are too dramatic to overlook. In those cases, said John F. Dovidio,
a psychology professor at Yale, we focus on the contradiction ..... Id. Doing so helps us "'find a way to make
the world make sense again, even if the way we do it is to say, "This is an exceptional situation." It's easier for [a
person] to keep the same categories in [her] mind and come up with an explanation for the things that are
discrepant.'" Id.
9. See Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 59-60, 66-67, 71; Stephen A. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of
Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8, 13; Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behav-
ing Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, n.49 (2003) [hereinafter Hill, Behaving Badly].
10. See Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 81.
II. See generally The Role of Financial Institutions in Enron's Collapse: Hearing Before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigotions of the S. Comm. on Governent Affairs, 107th Cong. 107-618 (2002).
12. See FITCH RATINGS, STRUCTURED FINANCE, CREDIT MARKET RESEARCH, FITCH GLOBAL STRUCTURED
FINANCE 1991-2005 DEFAULT STUDY (2006), available at http://www.fitchratings.com/dtp/pdf3-06/5fit0707.
pdf; MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH, SPECIAL COMMENT, DEFAULT & Loss RATES OF
STRUCTURED FINANCE SECURITIES: 1993-2005 (2006), available at http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/con-
tent.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free+pages/Credit+Policy+Research/documents/current/2005600000426138.
pdf.
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sufficient." Finally, it could reasonably be thought that since (and as a result of)
Enron, the regulatory regime and the overall climate had changed to make such
massive fraud less likely to occur, or at least less likely to continue unnoticed. In
this essay, I explain in more detail the story set forth above, and draw some
conclusions.
II. THE ARGUMENT
A. Prior Beliefs Encounter Disconfirming Evidence
Imagine a world in which people did not have much faith in their prior beliefs, and
hence revisited them thoroughly and often. Daily life would be virtually impossible,
given that we probably see potentially disconfirming evidence constantly. Revisiting
our prior beliefs constantly is exceedingly time-consuming and, more significantly,
potentially paralyzing. I believe that if I put an envelope in the mail slot, or give it
to a commercial carrier, it will usually get delivered to the addressee-imagine if I
seriously questioned that belief and had to seek other ways of sending mail? Simi-
larly, I believe that if I buy groceries from my local store, I can feed them to dinner
party guests without (much) fear of poisoning them-imagine if I felt that I had to
test all of the food by sending it to a lab. (And if I had to test the labs too .... )
We therefore have ways of reconciling the prior belief with the evidence in ways
that preserve the prior belief while not denying the evidence. Consider the well-
worn example of belief in God notwithstanding that God clearly 'lets bad things
happen to good people.' The accommodation of this belief and the disconfirming
evidence often refers to a grand plan that people do not have access to, which
would prove the true goodness of what God has done, or that in a particular in-
stance, God lost against Satan. Moreover, keeping the prior belief in spite of the
disconfirming evidence is often characterized as a virtue, the virtue of faith. 4 Con-
sider another belief: that what is reported in a reputable newspaper is generally
true. I might see a story in the business press that does not properly capture the
corporate law ramifications and conclude that reporters may not always get the
technical details in the field correct; that is my way of salvaging my prior belief but
nevertheless accommodating the potentially disconfirming evidence. And another:
I believe that people generally like desserts. I have a few friends who I have discov-
ered do not, and I now conclude that most people like desserts, except for the few
who do not.
Sometimes the disconfirming evidence cannot be accommodated with the prior
belief, or can only be so accommodated with great difficulty, such that the prior
belief itself becomes precarious, amenable to disconfirmation itself." In this regard,
13. See Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 78-79.
14. Of course, this description is wildly simplified and glosses over myriad complexities. Still, using the
example seems worthwhile because it is a paradigmatic case of the phenomenon that I am describing.
15. See NisBFTT & Ross, supra note 8, at 175-79, 188-91.
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many economists are finding the traditional views about how markets work unten-
able, or at least very difficult to maintain, in the face of this financial crisis. 6 More-
over, some prior beliefs are not held deeply in the first instance, and would be
abandoned in the face of even non-weighty evidence to the contrary. I ate Tas-
tykake cupcakes as a child in New York, and always believed they were primarily
associated with New York; I was recently served such cupcakes at a conference in
Philadelphia, and was told that the organizers had sought to serve Philadelphia
food. Revising my long-but-weakly held belief was clearly in order, and I have con-
firmed, as I write this essay, that what I was told in Philadelphia is indeed correct. 7
The dynamic I describe is akin to several described in the psychology literature.
Among them are belief perseverance, confirmation bias, and motivated reasoning,
as well as a related dynamic critical of motivated reasoning."i However, the dy-
namic that I describe is different in a critical respect. All of the psychological dy-
namics are largely about 'mistakes' or 'biases,' situations in which holding onto a
belief notwithstanding the disconfirming evidence is unwarranted, or reflects a
'bias.' Psychologists have amply demonstrated that there is a general human ten-
dency to hold on to a belief more than the evidence warrants. 9 But what I am
describing may or may not have been a mistake-I am agnostic on this point. Ex
post, listening to the rating agencies as to the value-of what are now called "toxic
securities" was clearly a bad idea. But ex ante, even after Enron, it may not have
been-and, I want to argue, there is a good chance that it was not.
Belief perseverance is holding one's views notwithstanding disconfirming
evidence.2"
16. See David Brooks, Op-Ed., An Economy of Faith and Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A29 ("The
[financial] crisis has delivered a blow to classical economics and taken a body of psychological work that was at
the edge of public policy thought and brought it front and center.").
17. Tastykake, Company History, http://www.tastykake.com/history.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) (stat-
ing that the company was started in Philadelphia in 1914, and that "Tastykake has become a true Philadelphia
success story.").
18. See, e.g., NISBETT & Ross, supra note 8; see also Craig A. Anderson, Belief Perseverance, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 109 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs, eds., 2007) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]; Bettina J. Cassad, Confirmation Bias, in ENCYCLOPEDIA Or SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra, at 162-63; Natalie D. Smoak, Beliefs, in Encyclopedia of Social Psychology, supra, at 11; Ziva Kunda,
The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990)."
Another such dynamic is subtyping. See generally, DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYP-
ING 404 (2005). Belluck provides an example:
Even when presented with multiple exceptions to the stereotype, we often keep the broad category
and simply create a subtype, [Yale Psychology] Professor Dovidio said. For example, President
Obama challenged negative stereotypes about blacks, but some people may have come up with a
subtype of blacks-black professionals-rather than challenge the overall stereotype, Professor
Dovidio said. "That does it in the simplest and most cognitively energy-saving way."
Belluck, supra note 8. Typically, subtyping is a mistake. The stereotype is incorrect; subtyping allows us to
preserve it. That being said, it is certainly possible that a particular instance of subtyping is not a mistake-that
the stereotype really is largely valid.
19. See, e.g., NISBETT & Ross, supra note 8. "People tend to persevere in their beliefs well beyond the point
at which logical and evidential considerations can sustain them." Id. at 192.
20. Anderson, supra note 18, at 109; Smoak, supra note 18, at Ill.
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Beliefs are important foundations of attitudes and behavior, but they can be
extremely difficult to change. Often, people will vehemently maintain their
beliefs even in light of disconfirming evidence. This phenomenon is known as
belief perseverance. Belief perseverance typically occurs because people base
their beliefs on information that they find logical, compelling, or attractive in
some way. Therefore, even when beliefs are seemingly disconfirmed by new
evidence, the foundation for what the person believes may still exist. At times,
the belief will still be maintained because of the remaining support of the ex-
planation behind it.2
Typically, what is stressed in accounts of belief perseverance is clinging to one's
beliefs more strongly than is warranted. The text quoted above is from a prominent
social psychology encyclopedia's entry on "beliefs."22 The entry on "belief persever-
ance," immediately preceding, notes that "[p] eople tend to hold on to their beliefs
even when it appears that they shouldn't."'2 The entry acknowledges that it is not
always clear when people should hold onto their beliefs in the face of disconfirming
evidence. But the overall tone nevertheless makes clear that the term "belief perse-
verance" generally refers to a mistake. The entry ends with the following:
"[r]esearch also has investigated ways to reduce belief perseverance. The most obvi-
ous solution, asking people to be unbiased, doesn't work. However, several tech-
niques do reduce the problem: The most successful is to get the person to imagine
or explain how the opposite belief might be true."24
Another relevant dynamic is confirmation bias,2" "one example of how humans
sometimes process information in an illogical, biased manner."'26 The entry contin-
ues as follows:
One explanation for why humans are susceptible to the confirmation bias is
that it is an efficient way to process information. Humans are bombarded with
information in the social world and cannot possibly take the time to carefully
process each piece of information to form an unbiased conclusion. Human de-
cision making and information processing is often biased because people are
limited to interpreting information from their own viewpoint. People need to
21. Smoak, supra note 18, at I11.
22. Id.
23. Anderson, supra note 18, at 109.
24. Id. at 110.
25. Cassad, supra note 18, at 162.
Confirmation bias refers to processing information by looking for, or interpreting, information that
is consistent with one's existing beliefs. This biased approach to decision making is largely uninten-
tional and often results in ignoring inconsistent information. Existing beliefs can include one's expec-
tations in a given situation and predictions about a particular outcome. People are especially likely to
process information to support their own beliefs when the issue is highly important or self-relevant.
Id.
26. Id.
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process information quickly to protect themselves from harm. It is adaptive to
rely on instinctive, automatic reflexes that keep humans out of harm's way.27
Motivated reasoning, also a pertinent dynamic, has been described in one of the
seminal articles as follows: "motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a
biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluat-
ing beliefs." '2 The article's author notes that what he means by motivation is "any
wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task."29
The article distinguishes between two different motives: one, "to arrive at an accu-
rate conclusion, whatever it may be," and the other, "to arrive at a particular, direc-
tional conclusion."30 The phenomenon that I am describing does not cleanly fit into
either category, nor does it cleanly fit into the article's conclusion, that "accuracy
goals lead to the use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appro-
priate, whereas directional goals lead to the use of those that are considered most
likely to yield the desired conclusion."3 The article characterizes as "[tihe major
and most damaging criticism of the motivational view ... that all research pur-
ported to demonstrate motivated reasoning could be reinterpreted in entirely cog-
nitive, nonmotivational terms," enabling people to "draw self-serving conclusions
not because they wanted to but because these conclusions seemed more plausible,
given their prior beliefs and expectancies."32 The conclusions that I am describing
do not seem 'self-serving' in the way that that term is usually understood.33 But the
general reasoning in the criticism accords with my view: that it is sensible not to be
agnostic about one's prior beliefs, but rather, to give them some presumption of
soundness. One's prior beliefs might be wrong, but one would generally need some
weighty evidence-quantitatively or qualitatively-to come to that conclusion. Be-
ing agnostic about one's prior beliefs is not a good way to proceed; we can expect
those who give their prior beliefs some weight to do better than those who do not.34
Psychologists Nisbett and Ross note that:
[iut seems possible that the behavior of subjects, inappropriate as it is from the
standpoint of rationality in the inferential contexts studied, may arise from
pursuit of important, higher order epistemic goals. Two such possible superor-
27. Id.
28. Kunda, supra note 18, at 480.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 481.
32. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
33. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines self-serving as "serving one's own interests often in
disregard of the truth or the interests of others." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1062 (10th ed.
1997).
34. Even psychologists who accept the general view that beliefs preserve more than logic and evidence
warrant think that "such perseverance serves goals that may be more fundamental and important than holding
correct views of particular issues." Nisbett & Ross, supra note 8, at 167.
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dinate goals are (a) the importance of stability to beliefs and belief-systems,
even despite occasional logical inconsistency and (b) real-world constraints on
time, which may prohibit the carefid and dispassionate perusal and integration
of all new evidence pertinent to any particular belief The possibility that sub-
jects were acting in accordance with such higher order goals should make us
reluctant to assume that their behavior is as inappropriate as would be implied
by narrower considerations of the justification for a particular belief, in a par-
ticular context, at a particular time."
This passage follows a discussion of the (strength of) the evidence that people hold
onto beliefs more than they should, and is succeeded by a passage noting that
people may not have "such higher order goals" in doing so. 6
Paradigmatically, in the typical cases studied by psychologists, there is no deter-
minate 'right answer' as to whether the prior belief at issue should, or should not,
be maintained. By contrast, there was no such answer at the time investors needed
to determine whether or not, and to what extent, to listen to rating agencies. (There
is now!") In such a case, the evolutionary/higher-order reasons why revisiting prior
beliefs often is a bad idea might very well carry the day, especially where it is
possible, as it was with the rating agencies post-Enron (and pre-crisis), to accom-
modate the evidence tending to disconfirm the belief at issue with a continued,
albeit modified, adherence to the belief. In what follows, I will demonstrate how
this dynamic-according significant weight to one's prior beliefs even in the face of
some disconfirming evidence-explains why anyone would listen to the rating
agencies after Enron.
B. The Rationale
The major rating agencies-Moody's, Standard and Poor's and, more recently,
Fitch-have been a fixture of investment decisions for quite some time. Many
scholars have recounted the history; the scholars have some disagreements, but not
as to the fact that for many types of securities, almost all the issuances are rated.
Ratings, and rating agencies, are thus an important fact of life for those making
investment decisions.38
35. Id. at 191-92 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 192.
37. At least as to highly complex securities. Rating agency ratings of companies and their senior debt are
still being mentioned as though they were informative, and they probably are. See, e.g., Moody's Downgrades
Lincoln National Senior Debt, FORBES.COM, Mar. 19, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2009/
03/19/ap6191054.html.
38. See generally Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5; Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating
Industry, FED. REs. BANK N.Y. Q. REv., Summer-Fall 1994, at 1, 2; Richard Sylla, An Historical Primer on the
Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 19-40 (Richard
M. Levitch et al., eds., 2002).
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What do investors think of rating agencies? I have argued that pre-Enron, inves-
tors thought of the major rating agencies as providing some, although not cutting-
edge, information. 9 At a time, securities issued without both Moody's and Stan-
dard and Poor's ratings were discounted by the market." Some scholars, most no-
tably Frank Partnoy, have argued that ratings were used principally, if not
exclusively, to meet regulations applicable to some institutional investors such as
pension funds and insurance companies.4 He therefore argues that ratings have no
informational value.42 While it is true that regulation did require some investors to
purchase mostly rated securities, investors favored securities rated by two rating
agencies over those rated by one such agency, even when the applicable regulation
only required one rating."
Ratings might provide information indirectly, rather than because the rating
agencies correctly analyze the securities being rated.44 Rather than reflecting a se-
curity's value, they might to some extent cause the security to have the value they
assign.45 If a company can issue AAA rated debt, that company's borrowing costs
will be lower, increasing the value of the company and the debt. Moreover, the
information might consist, in whole or in part, of the signal that the company
obtaining the rating knew what markets wanted it to do, and, in the case of compa-
nies obtaning two ratings where only one was required, was willing to undergo
more scrutiny than required. 6 Still, none of this undermines the point that inves-
tors could think ratings were by and large accurate, without thinking particularly
highly of the rating agencies' work product and the people who produce it.47 My
own view, argued for in my article on the subject, is as stated above: nobody
thought the rating agencies had lots of rocket scientists among the people making
the ratings, but they were thought of as sound enough. It is rather like the detective
who eventually gets his man through dogged, albeit uninspired, efforts. A rating
was necessary, for all the reasons mentioned above, but not sufficient."
39. See supra note 9.
40. Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 66 n.1 17 ("One finding is that where Moody's and Standard and
Poor's both give the same rating, investors accept less of a return than they do where there is only one rating, or
a rating by either Moody's or Standard and Poor's accompanied by a second rating from Fitch.").
41. Partnoy, Siskel & Ebert, supra note 3, at 690-92, 698.
42. Id. at 698.
43. Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 66.
44. Id. at 71.
45. Id.
When rating agencies downgrade an issue and the issue later defaults, the failure may very well have
been caused by the downgrade .... And the same may be true prospectively. Because ratings have so
much influence on the terms on which a company can get financing, they may be self-fulfilling,
Id.
46. Id. at 73. In abiding by the two-ratings norm, an issuer signals that it has nothing to hide. Id.
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id.
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Then came Enron. The rating agencies had, of course, been shown to be spectac-
ularly wrong before Enron.49 One notorious instance, involving the default of the
Washington Public Power Supply System, was aptly referred to as 'whoops.' Other
debacles in the rating agency hall of shame have included Executive Life, the "Asian
Flu," Orange County, and National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE).SI The
press did not spare the rating agencies; one article in Euromoney after the Asian Flu,
Rating Agencies Caught With Their Pants Down?, included a fabulously evocative
cartoon. 2 But all of these instances could be characterized as exceptional-some
involved crooks, notably NCFE,53 and one involved a cascade of recessions in Asia
(the Asian Flu). 4 Orange County involved complex derivatives,5 but not 'when
everyone was doing it.' It also arguably involved high-pressure sales tactics used by
Merrill Lynch on somebody who was perhaps not the savviest investor, the elected
treasurer of the county. 6 As the Los Angeles Times delicately put it,
49. See id. at 78-79; Partnoy, Siskel & Ebert, supra note 3, at 661-62.
50. In 1983, Washington Public Power Supply System, also known as "Whoops," defaulted on $2.25 billion
in bonds used to finance partial construction of a nuclear power plant, at the time the biggest municipal bond
default in U.S. history. Charles P. Alexander et al., Whoops! A $2 Billion Blunder, TIME, Aug. 8, 1983, at 58,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,955183-1,00.html. Moody's and Standard &
Poor's were stied by Whoops's bondholders because they had given Whoops bonds high ratings. Id.
51. Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 78-79.
52. Rating Agencies Caught With Their Pants Down?, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1998, at 51.
53. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former National Century Financial Enterprises CEO Convicted of Con-
spiracy, Fraud and Money Laundering (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/
October/08 crm-975.html; National Century Financial Enterprises Executives Donald H. Ayers, Rebecca S. Par-
rett, Randolph H. Speer, Roger S. Faulkenberry and James E. Dierker Found Guilty in $3 Billion Fraud Scheme,
BACKGOUNDNow.com, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.backgroundnow.com/blog/background-check/national-cen
tury-financial-enterprises- executives- donaid- h-ayers- rebecc a- s-parrett- randolph h- speer- roger-s-faulkenberry
and-james-e-dierker- found-guilty-in-3 -billion- fraud-scheme/.
At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendants engaged in a scheme to deceive
investors and rating agencies about the financial health of NCFE and how investor monies would be
used. Between May 1998 and May 2001, NCFE sold notes to investors with an aggregate value of $4.4
billion, which evidence presented at trial showed were worth approximately six cents on the dollar at
the time of NCFE's bankruptcy in November 2002.... NCFE presented a business model to investors
and rating agencies that called for NCFE to purchase high-quality accounts receivable from health-
care providers using money NCFE obtained through the sale of asset-backed notes to institutional
investors. The evidence at trial showed that NCFE advanced money to health care providers without
receipt of the requisite accounts receivable, oftentimes to healthcare providers that were owned in
whole or in part by the defendants. The evidence further showed that the defendants lied to investors
and rating agencies in order to cover up this fraud.
Id.
54. Rating Agencies Caught With Their Pants Down?, supra note 52.
55. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 365 ("[Orange County Treasurer]
Citron's highly leveraged investments [consisting of complex derivatives and other interest-sensitive securities]
ultimately inflicted losses of more than $1.6 billion on Orange County.").
56. See Dana Parsons, Citron on the Witness Stand Was One Way to Court Disaster, L.A. TIMES, June 5,
1998, at B1.
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
WHY DID ANYONE LISTEN TO THE RATING AGENCIES AFTER ENRON?
Merrill Lynch also came to realize that [Orange County Treasurer] Citron
didn't always rely on standard investment techniques. For more than a decade,
the treasurer used a $4.50 star chart, purchased from an Indianapolis astrolo-
ger, to help make investment decisions for the county, as well as for local
schools, cities and special districts.5 7
In all of the cases there were ready narratives consistent with a prior belief that
the rating agencies were 'good enough.' The rating agencies did not purport to be
able to detect lying," It did not seem so damning not to be able to anticipate
macroeconomic events in far-away places. And the rating agencies had quite a good
track record, over a long period of time-their ratings, at least on a relative basis,
and, it seemed, on an absolute basis as well, had proven largely accurate. 9
Enron, of course, was quite embarrassing. An investment grade rating for a com-
pany four days away from bankruptcy is not so easy to live down. How could
anyone listen to the rating agencies again? As noted above, Enron involved massive
fraud and complexity. Subprime securities involved complexity but not, it was
thought, massive fraud. The generally held view was that rating agencies were
equipped to appraise complexity, or at least not be stymied by it.6" Even though the
low-level analysts might not be 'rocket scientists,' the overall methodology devel-
oped by higher-level and more talented people was sound. Moreover, subprime
securities were 'natural' descendants of well-known mortgage backed securities,
which the rating agencies had been rating successfully for close to thirty years.6
Rating agencies' websites contained (and still contain) detailed materials describing
their methodology for rating mortgage-backed and other structured securities; the
materials read as though the standards were very exacting and conservative.62 For
the first few years during which subprime mortgages were securitized-when hous-
57. See Davan Maharaj & Shelby Grad, Seducing Citron: How Merrill Influenced Fund and Won Profits, L.A.
TIMES, July 26, 1998, at Al; see also John Greenwald et al., The California Wipeout, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/O,9171,982029,oo.html.
58. See Hill, Behaving Badly, supra note 9, at 1150. In this regard, note that Ronald Barone, a Managing
Director of Standard & Poor's characterized Enron as a "fraud problem," not a "ratings problem."
59. Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 67 ("[V]oluminous empirical evidence suggests that in the nor-
mal course, rating agencies do fairly well in gauging the relative quality of the financial instruments and firms
they rate."); see also supra note 12.
60. Well before the subprime market developed, and indeed, before the explosion of financial innovation
in the 1990s, Henry Hu expressed this view in his article, Henry TC. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 432-33 (1989). Hu expressed
confidence in the ability of rating agencies, having "developed specific expertise with respect to complex new
financial products and with respect to financial guaranty insurers," to properly evaluate complex securities. The
rating agencies' track record with complex securities through the 1990s reinforced this view. See supra note 12.
61. See generally Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061,
1119-26 (1996) [hereinafter Hill, Securitization; see also Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial
Crisis, BROOKINGS FIXING FINANCE SERIES 7-9, Nov. 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/
2008/1 _originscrisisbaily.litan/11 _origins_crisis_bailylitan.pdf.
62. See, e.g., STANDARD AND POOR'S, U.S. CMBS LEGAL AND STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA (2003),
available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/cmbslegalcriteria.pdf.
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ing prices were rising exponentially,63 and before underwriting standards reached
their nadir-the securitization securities (and the underlying mortgages) per-
formed quite well.64 And there were many, huge, reputable market participants in-
volved, participants who had their own considerable reputational and financial
stakes in the viability of the securities. There did not seem to be much potential for
massive fraud. There certainly were no Skilling- or Fastow-like figures, brilliant
designers of financial instruments who, in retrospect, were able to create cash flows
out of loan proceeds and "sell" assets they were actually keeping65-in short, there
were no people able to create a wholly false financial appearance to disguise a disas-
trous reality. Indeed, structured finance is precisely that, structured. The risks be-
ing segregated are precisely those that are not residual risks relating to a company,66
which were the very risks that proved so problematic with Enron." So, investors
could tell themselves: this is not another Enron. And surely rating agencies are
being extra-cautious after Enron.6" Rating agencies cannot be getting it massively
wrong. Even if they are getting it a bit wrong, surely AAA securities cannot be junk.
And the agencies have always done far better at initial ratings than downgrades:
after all, Enron involved downgrades. So, investors had a story to permit them to
continue doing what they had been doing, which was to use rating agencies as a
valuable input in their investment decisions.
63. Baily, supra note 61, at 11 ("From 1991 through the third quarter of 2007, the [Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight] house price index for the U.S. showed increases in every single quarter, when
compared to the same quarter in the prior year."). Most of the professionals involved in creating and packaging
the toxic securities work in Manhattan. See Saskia Sassen, Global Financial Centers, 78 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 75, 76
(1999). Manhattan's real estate prices have defied the laws of gravity for quite some time. Christine Haughney,
Apartment Prices in Manhattan Defy National Real Estate Slide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, at B1 (Manhattan saw
a record high for real estate prices in the fourth quarter of 2007, while the rest of the country's real estate
markets were experiencing stagnation); Christine Haughney, Manhattan Apartment Prices Hit Record High De-
spite Slump, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at B1 ("While most of the nation plods through a housing slowdown,
Manhattan is experiencing its highest prices in history."); Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven Saks,
Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J. LAw & ECON. 331 (2005). Thus,
perhaps one reason investment bankers, lawyers, and investors (and rating agency employees) could find an
exponential increase in real estate prices plausible was that Manhattan's real estate prices had seemed to be on
such a trajectory for quite a while. I thank Matt Easterday for this suggestion.
64. See supra note 12.
65. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. EcoN. PERSP. 3, 10-11 (2003).
66. See Hill, Securitization, supra note 61.
67. In Enron, the ratings that proved so embarrassing were those of Enron's senior debt. Ratings of a
company's senior debt are colloquially referred to as those of the company. The assessment as to whether the
company can pay its debt involves looking at the bundle of assets and liabilities that comprise the company,
and includes, importantly, a determination of its residual risks. By contrast, for complex securities such as
those involved in the present crisis, the inquiry involves some precisely segregated bundle that does not contain
these sorts of residual risks.
68. See Hill, Rating Agencies, supra note 5, at 70 ("Indeed, after being criticized for downgrading too slowly
in Enron and the other debacles, the rating agencies greatly accelerated their pace of downgrading; the agencies
were then criticized for downgrading too quickly."). The same reasoning was used in some accounts of how
directors who had been on the WorldCom board might nevertheless still be deemed desirable as directors. See
Andrew Countryman, WorldCom Mess Hasn't Disqualified Former Directors, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2004, at C1.
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III. CONCLUSION
So what? Why does any of this matter? We now know that relying on the rating
agencies was a big mistake; why anyone listened to the agencies after Enron matters
for how we deal with investors and rating agencies-how we judge what they did,
and how we go forward to minimize the chance of another crisis.
Whatever else is true, in the future, all market participants should be wary. Mar-
ket participants are always looking for the next great thing-the higher yielding
instrument that does not carry commensurate risk. 'Rocket scientists' can, appar-
ently, convince themselves (as well as their employers, the investment banks, and
the investment banks' clients) that they have defied fundamental laws of finance
and found that thing.69 In a world where people can bet other peoples' money, and
many institutions are too big or too interconnected to fail, investment decisions
potentially become everyone's problem. We will dole out blame, and vilify some of
the actors involved. But if we want to minimize the chance and severity of future
crises, we can't just deal with the bad guys. We'll need to deal with normal market
actors as well. Had such actors not concluded that subprime investments were a
good deal, we almost certainly wouldn't have had the crisis we now have. In retro-
spect, we can see how wrong they were. But it doesn't do us much good to project
what we know now into the past. To minimize the chance of future crises, we need
to spend much more time understanding how normal market actors think.
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69. See Steve Lohr, In Modeling Risk, the Human Factor Was Left Out, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1.
'"Innovation can be a dangerous game,' said Andrew W. Lo, an economist and professor of finance at the Sloan
School of Management of MIT." Id.
